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Anthropic Open-Sources FlashProve: zkSNARK Proofs That a Reply Came From the Committed Model, About 110 Tokens/s for 400B Llama 4 Maverick on One H100

Anthropic's Frontier Red Team published a research post on November 2 and open-sourced FlashProve under Apache 2.0. A model provider commits to hidden weights once, then attaches a zero-knowledge proof to each reply, so a user without the weights can check on an ordinary CPU that the reply really came from that model. That targets routing services that quietly swap in cheaper models and tampered token streams. Anthropic reports about 110 tokens/s on one H100 for Llama 4 Maverick (400B MoE, 4-bit), proofs of about 19 MB per 1,024-token request, and roughly 70-95x the GPU time of vLLM inference. It is an unmaintained research prototype limited to 1,024-token contexts and greedy decoding of an integer version of the model. Anthropic engineer Steve Weis shared the release on X.

Anthropic Open-Sources FlashProve: zkSNARK Proofs That a Reply Came From the Committed Model, About 110 Tokens/s for 400B Llama 4 Maverick on One H100

Key Takeaways

  • Anthropic-reported: on Llama 4 Maverick (400B MoE, 4-bit) one H100 proves about 110 tokens/s (prefill, 24 requests per batch), with proofs of about 19 MB per 1,024-token request.
  • It is costly: roughly 70-95x the GPU time of vLLM inference; the performance page lists about 270 GB of host memory for serving and about 39 minutes to commit to a set of weights.
  • Verification needs no GPU: the C++ verifier checks a proof in about 21 seconds on one thread, and a slower Lean verifier plus Lean 4 proofs of the security theorem are included.
  • Against prior work: VerInf proved the same model at about 0.02 tokens/s; the commercial Attestable reached 53-77 tokens/s on Gemma 4 31B but has no open-source release.
  • Limits: v0.16.0 is an unmaintained research prototype with 1,024-token contexts, greedy decoding of an integer model only, and no architecture hiding.
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Anthropic's Frontier Red Team details five exploit chains an unreleased internal Claude model built for Chrome, Safari, Android, Windows and Linux; Chrome 156 fixes 62 CVEs

Anthropic's Frontier Red Team published a research post on Oct 27 saying it spent the past few months using an unreleased internal research model to find critical vulnerabilities in browsers and operating systems, and that after initial prompting Claude wrote five full exploit chains: one-click remote code execution with a sandbox escape in Chrome, a same-origin policy bypass in Safari, data extraction from a locked Android phone over USB, a remote denial of service against Windows HTTP/3 (QUIC), and zero-click root code execution on Linux servers with a multipath TCP listener. Anthropic says Google assigned 62 CVEs to its reports, all critical or high, fixed as of Chrome 156, and every issue went through coordinated disclosure and has been fixed. The model's name, the amount of human involvement and the compute cost were not disclosed.

Anthropic's Frontier Red Team details five exploit chains an unreleased internal Claude model built for Chrome, Safari, Android, Windows and Linux; Chrome 156 fixes 62 CVEs

Key Takeaways

  • The Chrome chain links 4 bugs: V8 heap corruption, a V8 sandbox escape that defeats ASLR, a CacheStorage race condition and a FedCM use-after-free; the PoC launches Calculator within seconds of a page loading in default Chrome on macOS
  • Per Anthropic, Google assigned 62 CVEs to its reports, all critical or high, including 13 sandbox escapes and 21 renderer-compromise bugs, fixed as of Chrome 156
  • The Windows kernel QUIC out-of-bounds read is CVE-2026-33096, with likely several million exposed servers by Anthropic's estimate; the Linux MPTCP zero-click root bug is CVE-2026-98432, where the PoC leaks a kernel pointer in about 48 minutes and reaches root command execution about 5 minutes later
  • Method: many parallel scanning agents scored by the extra vulnerabilities they add, with coverage tracking and automated variant analysis on every confirmed finding; Anthropic recommends scanning at PR time and has released a Claude Code security plugin
  • The model is an unnamed internal research model; Anthropic did not publish the share of human work, failed attempts or compute cost
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⚡ Claude (unreleased internal research model)🤖 Claude Code🌐 Anthropic🌐 Google🌐 Apple🌐 Microsoft

Anthropic Frontier Red Team: Claude, working with Theorem, formally proved no-crash properties at the RISC-V assembly level for 239 entry points across 123 OSS-Fuzz libraries, about 180M lines of Rocq

On 2026-10-22 Anthropic’s Frontier Red Team, working with Theorem, published research in which Claude turned OSS-Fuzz fuzz tests into formal specs and proved on the compiled RISC-V binaries that no input under 64 MB causes a crash. Over a few weeks it proved 239 entry points across 123 libraries, about 180 million lines of Rocq checked by the Rocq kernel. Along the way it found and patched hundreds of bugs, including an out-of-bounds write that needed a roughly 20 MB input with a rare layout. Anthropic says Opus 5.5 needs about 40% fewer tokens than Opus 5 to finish proofs.

Anthropic Frontier Red Team: Claude, working with Theorem, formally proved no-crash properties at the RISC-V assembly level for 239 entry points across 123 OSS-Fuzz libraries, about 180M lines of Rocq

Key Takeaways

  • Scale: 239 entry points across 123 OSS-Fuzz libraries, about 180M lines of Rocq, a typical proof about 600,000 lines for binaries with a median of 18,000 RISC-V instructions
  • Scope: no crash (including ASan memory errors and failed assertions) for any input under 64 MB, assuming a single-threaded static RISC-V binary on Linux with musl
  • Hundreds of bugs found while proving, including an out-of-bounds write that needed about a 20 MB input, plus a rediscovery of CVE-2026-56132 in libexpat
  • On 36 small verification tasks Opus 5.5 proves half with about 40% fewer tokens than Opus 5; a shared proof workspace cut tokens a further 17% (Anthropic figures)
  • A subset of proofs and the RISC-V and Linux semantics are public (theorem-labs/oss-verify-proofs), and Theorem published a Claude skill to help developers start
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